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Abstract
The public health risk of influenza at the human-animal interface is dicey, due in part to 
continuous evolution of the virus. Influenza virus consist of 7 genera of which only influ-
enza A is at present zoonotic, where subtypes H5, H7 and H9 of avian origin and subtype 
H1 and H3 of swine origin are important. The most devastating influenza pandemic in 
history was suspected to have emerged from avian reservoir and manifested in 1918. The 
first recognized direct human transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
H5N1 occurred in 1997 in Hong Kong. Subsequently, many cases of varying severity 
have been described in people who were exposed to poultry. More recently in 2009, triple 
reassortant influenza A of swine origin (A/H1N1pdm09) caused the first pandemic of 
the twenty-first century and since 2013, H7N9 though initially benign in birds, caused 
fatal infection in humans who had contact with poultry. These public health threats 
from animal influenza virus are aggravated by increase co-mingling in shared human-
animal environment. Therefore, the challenge of emerging zoonotic influenza viruses on 
human host immunity, efficacy of vaccines and antiviral resistance require continuous 
risk assessment of virological and clinical changes that have impact on control measures 
including advances in vaccines and chemotherapeutics.
Keywords: influenza viruses, zoonotic transmission, reassortment, immunity and 
vaccines, antiviral resistance
1. Historical perspective on zoonotic influenza
The family of influenza virus, known as Orthomyxoviridae, consists of 7 genera viz.: Influenza 
A, B, C and D. Others are Thogotovirus, Quaranjavirus and Isavirus which are associated with 
arthropods and fish [1]. Only 3, influenza A, B and C so far have been described in humans, 
while only Influenza A is commonly transmitted from animals to human and vice versa [2, 3]. 
Influenza A virus (IAV) is further divided into subtypes based on the Hemagglutinin surface 
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glycoproteins (HA1-18) and Neuraminidase (NA1-11), HA1-16 and NA1-9 are those that are 
up till date identified to occur naturally in avian host, mostly waterfowls where they exist in 
benign form (low pathogenic) [4, 5]. Two additional subtypes (HA 17 and 18, NA 10 and 11) 
were identified in bats [6]. Genetic mutations and reassortment may occur spontaneously or 
over a long period in reservoir hosts. These result in the emergence of novel subtypes, reassor-
tants, strains or variants from the Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) precursors. These 
phenomena that have been described as antigenic shift and drift also contribute to the evolu-
tion, adaptation and inter-species transmission of influenza viruses and provide opportuni-
ties for gain of function in nature including molecular and or biological properties that may 
enhance zoonotic transmission. Sometimes a strain may arise in animals with adaptations of 
fitness to cause fatal infection or increase transmission and potentials to cause pandemics in 
human population [7, 8].
Aquatic birds are the most important group of animals in the ecology and epidemiology 
of influenza virus. Almost all naturally circulating subtypes of influenza virus in birds and 
mammals (including human) can be traced to avian descendants including earlier description 
in literature by Perroncito in 1878 [4, 9]. The first pandemic of influenza virus that occurred in 
1918 (Spanish flu) was caused by an avian influenza virus, as revealed by sero-archeology and 
molecular characterization [10, 11]. The 1918 influenza pandemic killed over 50 million people 
and about one third (500 million persons) of the world’s population had clinically apparent 
illnesses. The Case-fatality rate was greater than 2.5% in comparison to less than 0.1% in other 
influenza pandemics. Nearly half of influenza-related deaths were observed in young adults 
between the ages of 20–40 years, an indication that the virus was newly introduced possibly 
from animal reservoir to naive human population [12].
The causative virus of the 1918 pandemic, following human transmission, was concurrently 
transmitted to pigs in America, Europe and China. This was to play out again in 2009 when A/
H1N1pdm09 virus was also transmitted via anthropogenic means to swine. In both scenarios, 
the causative virus was eventually isolated in pigs [2, 13]. More epidemics and pandemics 
arising from descendants of the 1918 virus were subsequently recorded in 1957 Asian flu 
(H2N2), 1968 Hong Kong flu (H3N2) and the more recent H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic that 
originated in Mexico (Mexican flu). The common precursor of these viruses appeared to be an 
avian influenza virus that entered the human population directly or indirectly through inter-
mediate hosts probably at some points involving pigs as enunciated by Nelson et al. [14] and 
in Figure 1. Exceptionally, the 1918 pandemic virus appeared to have been wholly derived 
from avian-like influenza virus from an unknown source [15]. Thus zoonotic influenza trans-
mission seems to be the foundation of influenza virus infection in human including previous 
pandemics, contemporary and more recent transmissions and fatal human infections caused 
by avian H5, H7 and H9 in many countries [16, 17].
In the last 100 years, influenza virus in human are generally manifested as seasonal, zoonotic 
and pandemic with clinico-pathological manifestation that vary from mild, severe to fatal. 
However, the most threatening influenza infections are those caused by zoonotic and/or pan-
demic strains following their introduction usually from animal reservoir into human popula-
tion that has little or no pre-existing specific or cross protective immunity [18]. The burden of 
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zoonotic and potentially pandemic influenza A virus infections has therefore attracted global 
concern since the identification of avian and swine influenza viruses that can (with or with-
out biological or molecular adaptations) be transmitted directly, and cause severe disease in 
humans and other mammals. This was notable with the advent of A/Goose/Guangdong/96 
lineage of H5N1, which had infected 860 people and killed 454 (52% case-fatality rate) up till 
December 2017 [19]. Continuous circulation of H5N1 in birds and zoonotic transmission to 
human may cause influenza virus to acquire adaptive genetic features for efficient human to 
human transmission through mutations (insertions/deletions), reassortment or emergence of 
immune or antiviral resistant strains. Those may likely be precursors of emerging influenza 
virus with pandemic potential. Global surveillance for influenza diversity in animals and 
human may therefore greatly improve our ability for early detection, to identify and antici-
pate which strains are more likely to evolve and be better prepared [18].
2. Human infections with avian influenza virus
The first human transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 
occurred in 1997 in Hong Kong. It became a global public health concern, knowing that pan-
demic influenza viruses in the past originated from animals [20]. The H5N1 was thus consid-
ered a potential pandemic threat [21]. The HPAI H5N1 lineage (A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96) 
was initially isolated from a goose farm in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. In the following 
Figure 1. Illustration of cross-species transmission of avian, swine and human influenza viruses. Waterfowls as natural 
reservoirs, pigs serve as ‘mixing vessels’, viruses from humans seed pH1N1 in swine populations, reassortment between 
pH1N1 viruses and co-circulating triple reassortant H3N2 viruses in pigs generate novel reassortant H3N2v.
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year, outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 were reported in poultry at farms and live bird 
markets in Hong Kong. Subsequently, contact with poultry and exposure to infected live and/
or dead birds became the medium for human exposure and in Hong Kong there were alto-
gether, 18 cases (6 fatal) reported in the first known instance of human infection with this 
virus [22].
Early symptoms of influenza H5N1 virus usually develop 2 to 4 days after exposure to sick 
poultry and most patients infected with influenza H5N1 virus presents symptoms of fever, 
cough, shortness of breath and radiological evidence of pneumonia [21]. The number of 
human H5N1 cases reported globally was heightened in 2003 and since then, the virus has 
maintained a steady infection, morbidity and mortality at the animal-human interface. Those 
primarily at risk are cohorts of poultry farmers, handlers and operators in live bird markets 
and their immediate family members or contact. Though human to human transmission of 
H5N1 is not yet efficient, evolving nature of influenza virus in the environment is a reminder 
of the risk of emergence of a strain adapted for that possibility.
The HPAI (H5, H7) viruses circulating in terrestrial poultry (Chicken and turkeys) and are 
transmitted to human, normally emerge from the low pathogenic precursors in waterfowls. 
This arises by mutations in the gene and occurrence of multiple basic amino acids in the 
connecting peptide between the HA1 and HA2 domains of the HA0 precursor protein [23]. 
Trypsin-like proteases found in the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts may be responsible 
for this limited enzymatic cleavage hence pathology are usually restricted to these systems. 
However, when multiple basic amino acids are introduced by insertion or deletion in the HA 
cleavage site, the HA0 precursor becomes cleavable by a wide range of ubiquitous proteases 
found in many host tissues [24]. Consequently, the virus is able to replicate in almost all the 
tissues/organs beside the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts such as brain (nervous) and 
the cardiovascular (hematopoietic) system, resulting in fulminant and disseminated disease 
with high mortality index particularly in turkey and chicken [25].
In a peculiar incident, in February and March 2013, three patients were hospitalized with 
severe lower respiratory tract disease of unknown cause in China. The causative virus was 
later identified as novel avian-origin reassortant influenza A (H7N9), and phylogenetic analy-
sis of all genes of the isolate showed that each gene segment was of avian origin [17]. The 
HA cleavage site possessed only a single basic amino acid R (arginine) as against polybasic, 
indicating tendency to be of low pathogenicity in poultry. On the contrary, cases in human 
host were severe, with patients developing severe pneumonia, acute respiratory distress, 
and eventually death. All the three patients had pre-existing medical conditions, but more 
importantly two of them had a history of direct contact with poultry [17]. The switch in viru-
lence and pathogenicity were associated with certain mutations in the reassorted virus that 
may have contributed to severity of human infection and death. Similarly, waves of H5N8 
outbreaks, first detected in domestic birds in China in 2010, which later spread from 2014 
through 2016 in Europe and North America was heighten in the winter of 2016 and affected 
a wide range of domestic and wild birds but no human infection was recorded. Experimental 
studies even showed low virulence in ferret hence risks to human were considered low [26], 
even though the contemporary HPAI viruses of subtypes H5N2, H5N5, H5N6 and H5N8, all 
contain genes from 1997 A/Goose/Guangdong H5N1 lineage with acquired internal genes 
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from LPAIs. Interestingly, the H5N8 (clade 2.3.4.4) though virulent in poultry has remained 
of low susceptibility in human, but another newly emerged H5N6 first identified in a peafowl 
arising from reassortment of H5 clade 2.3.4.4 has shown virulence in human and has killed 
7 people among 17 that were infected since 2016 [27]. Repeated cases in human have raised 
concerns that subtype H5N6 virus also has the potential for crossover human infection which 
if sustained, may also be a candidate for influenza pandemic [28]. The notification of the first 
human case of novel subtype H7N4 to the Centre for Health Protection in Hong Kong on the 
14th of February 2018 is a reminder that avian influenza is continually evolving bird-human 
transmission [29]. This H7N4 event and previous H7N9 detection first in human before cases 
in poultry were noticed also shows that humans are fast becoming sentinel for influenza sur-
veillance at the human-animal interface.
3. The pandemic H1N1pdm09, zoonosis and reverse zoonosis
Triple reassortant influenza A/H1N1pdm09 originating in swine caused the 1st pandemic 
of the twenty-first century in 2009. This was at the time of HPAI H5N1 epizootics in Asia, 
Europe and Africa. The strain and the region thought to be probable epicenter of future pan-
demic was H5N1 and Asia. The severity and spread of HPAI H5N1 in poultry and subsequent 
transmission to human, lent credence to scientific speculations that the zoonotic virus might 
have been a pandemic strain. Unpredictably, while attention was on HPAI H5N1, a pandemic 
H1N1 influenza virus emerged in Mexico, although the virus was believed to have been cir-
culating in pigs many years before its first detection in human [16, 30]. The 2009 influenza 
pandemic spread to more than 214 countries and an estimated 151,700–575,400 respiratory 
and cardiovascular deaths were associated with the infection worldwide [31]. Lessons learnt 
include the realization that a zoonotic and pandemic virus may emerge from an animal reser-
voir in an unexpected location and spread rapidly throughout the world within a short time 
[32]. Also important is the realization that that the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus was subse-
quently transmitted from human to pigs in a phenomenon that has been variously described 
as reverse zoonosis reported in more than 20 countries in America, Europe, Asia and Africa. 
Interestingly, the swine influenza sequence data available in public gene bank showed that 
humans transmit far more influenza A virus to swine than pigs have ever transmitted to 
humans, at least in terms of viruses that are transmitted onward in the new host as against 
dead end or accidental hosts [14]. The implication is that endemic human-like influenza virus 
that is enzootic in pigs will continuously pose public health risk in the generation of Influenza 
variants (combination of human and swine influenza viruses). This has also been reported to 
cause human infections in people exposed to pigs especially in America [14].
Virus strains or variants resulting from reassortment of swine influenza A(H3N2) and influ-
enza A/H1N1pdm09 and similar viruses have been detected in swine in many countries. It is 
therefore of concern that emerging influenza variants could efficiently be transmitted among 
humans. Over 300 human cases of A(H3N2)v have been described between 2011 and 2012 in 
the United State alone beside clusters of human-human transmission further demonstrating 
that variant influenza viruses also pose a public health threat at the human-animal interface. 
Animals and humans may infect each other in intensive farms, abattoirs and agricultural fairs 
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when in close proximity [33, 34]. Our ability to predict and prevent outbreaks of zoonotic 
pathogens like influenza therefore requires an understanding of their ecology and evolution 
in reservoir hosts [35]. This is important because Influenza A viruses from animals including 
reassortant, novel and variants are considered of significant threat in the emergence of the 
next pandemic due to the abundance of permanent animal reservoirs harboring viruses that 
are now frequently spilling over into human.
4. Mutation, reassortment and variants influenza virus
Over the past 100 years, the IAVs have caused several pandemics including the one that has 
been described as “the greatest medical holocaust in history” [36]. Mutation and reassort-
ment are two well established factors that have contributed in zoonotic influenza viruses 
gaining the ability to adapt to humans, leading to pandemics and thereafter sustained 
human-to-human transmissions. The accumulation of mutations and genome reassortments 
have been the driving force for most of the IAV adaptability in humans as the IAV RNA 
genome replication lacks the exonuclease proofreading capability, thus giving rise to high 
nucleotide mutation rates [37]. Antigenic drift and shift are the two major phenomena in 
influenza viruses that lead to antigenically variant influenza viruses [1, 38, 39]. The antigenic 
drift refers to point mutations in the HA and/or NA while the antigenic shift leads to the 
formation of a new virus subtype with a novel combination of HA and NA from different 
subtypes. While the antigenic drift is responsible for yearly epidemics, the antigenic shift 
has been responsible for some of the devastating pandemics in influenza history claiming 
many lives, including the 1918-Spanish flu. A list of zoonotic influenza outbreaks have been 
summarized in Table 1.
The human influenza viruses have limited subtypes of HA and NA (H1, H2, H3 and N1, N2) 
whereas the avian influenza viruses infecting the poultry may harbor almost all the subtypes 
of HA and NA [40], thus giving rise to multiple recombination of HA and NA in avian spe-
cies. Since 1996, the HPAI-H5N1virus have claimed several lives resulting in high mortality 
rate while the recently identified LPAI-H7N9 in East China region had a mortality rate of 40% 
[41]. The H7N9 virus isolates have the capability of binding to both avian and human influ-
enza virus receptors due to presence of a leucine at amino acid position 217 [42]. A relatively 
limited number of mutations in the zoonotic IAV genome can lead to production of new viral 
progenies with capability of efficient transmission among mammals and studies have also 
demonstrated that amino acid substitutions in the HA protein can change the preference of 
binding receptors of influenza viruses. For example, the G186 V mutation in HA protein of 
H7N9 virus has been identified as the potential adaptation of the virus to human-type recep-
tors [43]. A recent study conducted on a non-laboratory-adapted virus A/Vietnam/1203/2004 
(H5N1) with an HA2-K58I point mutation (K to I at position 58) showed that a decrease in the 
HA activation pH (pH 5.5) influenced the viral properties as compared to the wild type virus 
(HA activation pH 6.0) in mammalian hosts [44]. The mutation increased the viral load in fer-
ret’s nasal cavity while it reduced the viral load in lungs thus supporting the fact that a single 
mutation could lead to an increased viral growth in mammalian upper respiratory tract [44]. 
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Several studies in ferrets have shown that the viruses such as H5N1 [45], H7N9 [46] and H7N1 
[47] could transmit through respiratory droplets after acquiring mutations in their genomes. 
Another study on A/Anhui/1/13 (H7N9) virus showed that substitutions at G219S and K58I 
resulted in high affinity for α2,6-linked sialic acid receptor and acid and temperature stability 
[48]. The increased polymerase activity due to mutation in the viral PB2 has also been linked 
to enhanced viral replication. The PB2 subunit from all avian viruses generally contains poly-
merases with glutamic acid at amino acid position 627 (E627) while the PB2 from human viral 
isolates almost exclusively have lysine at 627 (K627). Mehle et al. have shown that E627K 
mutation of PB2 conferred a high level of polymerase activity in human and porcine cells thus 
increasing the viral replication [49]. Another study showed that a basic amino acid at position 
591 of the PB2 subunit compensated for the lack of PB2-627 K in HPAI-H5N1 and pandemic 
H1N1viruses markedly increased the replication of these viruses in mammalian species [50]. 
The PB2 gene mutation in duck H7N9 also enhanced the polymerase activity and thus viral 
replication in human cells [51]. The H1N1 influenza virus that caused the 1918 pandemic and 
Year (Country) Influenza 
subtype
Confirmed cases Adaptation in segment
1997/2003-present (Asia, Europe and Africa) H5N1 660 N224 K (HA)
N158D (HA)
T160A (HA)
E627K (PB2)
2003 (USA) H7N2 1 Not determined
2003 (Hong Kong) H9N2 1 Q226L (HA)
G228S (HA)
T212A (HA)
2003 (The Netherlands) H7N7 89 E627K (PB2)
2004 (Egypt) H10N7 2 Not determined
2004 (Canada) H7N3 2 Not determined
2007 (UK) H7N2 4 Not determined
2008–2009 (Hong Kong) H9N2 2 Not determined
2012 (Mexico) H7N3 2 Not determined
2013 (China) H10N8 3 Not determined
2013 (China, Taiwan, Hong Kong) H7N9 137 Q226L (HA)
E627K (PB2)
2013 (Taiwan) H6N1 1 P186L (HA)
Since 2014 (China) H5N6 16 G540A (NS)
2018 (China) H7N4 1 Not determined
Table 1. Zoonotic influenza A viruses and identified adaptations (reviewed in [53] with modification).
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the H5N1 avian influenza virus isolated in 1997 (Hong Kong) both harbors the N66S mutation 
in PB1-F2 which drastically enhanced the pathogenicity of these viruses [52].
Genetic reassortment in influenza viruses is yet another vital event that leads to sudden 
outbreaks of influenza. Influenza viruses have a segmented genome and thus, simultaneous 
infection with other IAVs results in reassortment event leading to formation of new viral prog-
enies containing gene segments of mixed parental origin. Several pandemics have emerged 
in the past [54] and appears to be more frequent now than previously thought [55]. The reas-
sortment event can be a result of errors during the replication of viral RNA polymerase, the 
host environment, the immune or evolutionary pressure [56]. The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 
were caused by reassortant viral strains [57]. The HA, NA, and PB1 genes of the H2N2 1957 
pandemic strain and the HA and PB1 fragments of the H3N2 1968 pandemic strain were both 
derived from avian influenza virus strains [57]. The HPAI subtype H5N1 isolated from geese 
in Guangdong province in 1996 evolved to produce H5N8 clades 2.3.4.4 Gs/GD HPAIV. A 
recent study on the evolution and pathogenicity of H5N2 avian influenza viruses isolated in 
H5N1 endemic areas in China revealed that these viral isolates were derived from reassort-
ment events in which few isolates had the HA and NS derived from H5N1 while few had the 
HA derived from endemic H9N2 viruses [58]. A similar study from South Korea reported 
the emergence of novel reassortant H5N8 viruses in 2014 in ducks raised in breeder farms 
[59]. Since its first appearance, lineage of the HPAI H5N1 continues to circulate with lots of 
diversification of the HA gene into multiple genetic clades. The H5 clade 2.3.4.4 of the H5N8 
subtype was subsequently detected in several countries of Europe by the end of 2014 and in 
summer of 2016, it was detected again in wild aquatic birds sampled in western Siberia [60]. 
A recent study has also shown that the reassortment event between the Gs/GD lineage H5N8 
virus and North American origin viruses further resulted in the emergence of H5N1 and 
H5N2 viruses in the US [61].
Experimental observations have further revealed that reassortment between zoonotic and 
seasonal IAVs can result in production of airborne-transmissible viruses in mammals [62–65]. 
A study showed that a reassortant virus, comprising of the H5 hemagglutinin having 4 muta-
tions from H5N1 avian virus and remaining seven segments from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 
virus lead to reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus that gained the capacity of droplet transmis-
sion in ferret model [62]. Another experiment further showed that the avian H5N1 subtype 
viruses do have the potential to attain mammalian transmissibility by genetic reassortment 
[63]. The authors utilized reverse genetics to create several reassortant viruses between duck 
H5N1 (HA gene) and human-infective H1N1 virus to show that the new reassortant viruses 
could efficiently infect and sustained droplet transmission in guinea pigs without mortal-
ity [63]. Similar study reported that the avian-human H9N2 reassortant virus harboring the 
surface proteins of avian H9N2 in a human H3N2 backbone gained the ability of transmis-
sion through the respiratory droplets and caused clinical infection in ferrets similar to human 
influenza infections [64]. A recent study performed in a novel transfection-based inoculation 
system generated a reassortant H9N1 virus by transfecting the plasmids containing genes 
from H9N2 virus and pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus into HEK 293 T cells. The resulting 
transfections gave rise to two reassortant viruses (H9N1) that had the capability of droplet-
transmissibility [65].
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According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), when an influenza virus 
that normally circulates in swine (not in humans) is detected in humans, it is referred to as 
variant influenza viruses. The human infections with H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 variant viruses 
have been reported from United States [13, 65]. Although the variant influenza viruses rarely 
show sustained human-to-human transmission, yet there have been few strains that over-
came this barrier. All the cases reported in US were of swine origin rather than avian origin. 
In 2009, triple reassortant variant influenza virus was detected throughout the world and 
caused the first pandemic of twenty-first century. This variant virus had genes from avian, 
human, and swine influenza viruses claiming more than 12,500 lives in the US alone and 
about 575,400 globally [31, 66]. Later H3N2 variant viruses which had similarity with triple-
reassortant viruses were detected in US swine but had acquired the matrix gene from highly 
transmissible influenza A H1N1-2009 viruses which contributed in efficiency of transmission 
of the variant virus [67]. A recent study has also identified two distinct variants of H3N2 
influenza virus that grows in cell culture [68]. Both the variants differed in just one single 
mutation at amino acid 151 of NA. The D151 viral variant could efficiently grow in cell culture 
while the G151 viral variant showed extremely poor growth in cell culture system [68]. More 
in-depth studies are still needed to better understand the viral properties of variant influenza 
viruses as they continue to pose threat to human lives.
5. Immunity and challenges of vaccination
The isolation of influenza A/H1N1 in 1933 quickly ushered the development of the first 
generation of live-attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIV). The initially developed inactivated 
influenza vaccine (IIV) only targeted a single influenza strain (influenza A). Then, in 1942, 
a vaccine targeting both influenza A and B viruses were produced soon after the discovery 
of influenza B. Subsequently, scientists discovered that influenza viruses mutated, lead-
ing to antigenic changes (antigenic drift and antigenic shift). Since 1973, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has been providing yearly recommendations for the composition of the 
influenza vaccine, based on results of the virological surveillance conducted by the WHO’s 
Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS). Later in 1978, the trivalent 
influenza vaccine was developed that included two influenza A strains and one influenza B 
strain. Currently, two influenza B lineages are circulating (Yamagata and Victoria) therefore, 
since 2013, the WHO recommendations suggested a second B strain to be added to make a 
quadrivalent influenza vaccine (QIV) [69]. Influenza vaccines protect against infection and 
can reduce illness and severity of infection especially in groups at risk for flu complications 
such as children, the elderly, pregnant women, and individuals with underlying medical 
conditions like asthma, HIV/AIDS, and chronic heart or lung diseases [70]. Frequent influ-
enza infections at the human-animal interface may also warrant occupational vaccination for 
veterinarians, researchers, health care providers, farmers and animal traders who are more 
likely to be exposed to zoonotic influenza virus [71].
For over half a century now, WHO has been collaborating with scientists, epidemiolo-
gists, and policymakers to create an integrated approach to manufacture, test, and approve 
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influenza vaccine research and development efforts, including their proper use and efficient 
distribution. Since the virus mutates frequently, WHO, GISRS network and collaborating 
centers predict the strains that are expected to circulate in the following season because of 
the time required to manufacture vaccines. This happens twice a year, one for the northern 
hemisphere and another for the southern hemisphere [70]. But the virus can mutate during 
the time it takes to develop the vaccine, resulting in a mismatch between circulating virus and 
the vaccine.
Although the effectiveness of the flu vaccine varies from year to year depending mainly on the 
match of the strain in the vaccine and the circulating strain, most provide modest to high pro-
tection against influenza [72]. The US-CDC has reported that flu vaccination reduces medical 
visits, flu illness, hospitalizations, and deaths [73]. Vaccination is still the most efficient way to 
prevent infection and severe outcomes caused by influenza viruses.
The WHO and CDC recommend yearly vaccination for nearly everyone over 6 months of 
age, especially those at higher risk of influenza complications and mortality [70, 73]. The 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) also recommends yearly vac-
cination of high risk groups: older adults and all persons (over 6 months of age) with chronic 
medical conditions including those with diseases of the respiratory system (e.g. asthma), 
cardiovascular system (e.g. coronary artery disease), endocrine system (e.g. diabetes), 
hepatic system (e.g. liver cirrhosis), renal system (e.g. chronic renal failure), neurological/
neuromuscular conditions (e.g. parkinsonism), any condition compromising respiratory 
functions e.g. morbid obesity (BMI > 40), physical handicap in children and adults, and 
immunosuppression due to disease or treatment including due to hematological conditions 
and HIV infection [74].
Currently licensed flu vaccines include inactivated influenza vaccine (IIV), live attenuated 
influenza vaccine (LAIV), and recombinant HA vaccines [75]. These vaccines are either tri-
valent or quadrivalent with components representing influenza A and B viruses predicted 
to circulate in the next influenza season. The IIV is either a split virion or subunit vaccine 
containing 15 μg of each purified HA protein administered intramuscularly, or 9 μg of each 
purified HA protein administered intradermally [75]. A higher dose version with 60 μg of 
each HA antigen is available for older adults aged 65 years and above. The IIV induces a 
strain-specific serum IgG antibody response. A vaccine with an oil-in-water adjuvant MF59 
also enhances the immunogenicity of IIV in the elderly [76].
The LAIV contains live viruses with temperature-sensitive and attenuating mutations [77] 
and is a combination of the same four strains as the QIV. The LAIV is administered intra-
nasally as a spray. The mutations in the LAIV strains allow the viruses to replicate at the 
cooler temperature of the nasal cavity but prohibit replication at the temperature of the lower 
respiratory tract. The LAIV results in the production of strain-specific serum IgG as well 
as mucosal IgA and T cell responses [77]. The recombinant HA vaccine with HA proteins 
expressed in insect cells from baculovirus vectors is currently licensed only for adults aged 18 
to 49 years and are recommended for individuals who are allergic to eggs [75]. The manufac-
turing process for the recombinant HA vaccine is shorter than the IIV and LAIV, which would 
be important in case of a pandemic. The 2009 pandemic showed the challenges in production 
and distribution of vaccines against a newly emerged virus within a short timeframe given 
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the production timeline for both IIV and LAIV [78]. Production of IIV and LAIV require the 
use of embryonated eggs. Disadvantages for egg-based flu vaccine production include being 
contraindicated in people with severe allergies to eggs, and in the event of a pandemic where 
the virus is pathogenic to poultry, embryonated eggs may be in short supply [69]. Currently, 
licensed influenza vaccines focus on the production of antibodies against the viral HA pro-
tein, which binds host receptors to mediate viral entry. Strain-specific antibodies produced 
against the HA neutralize the virus and prevent infection. However, the HA is under positive 
selection for antigenic escape from neutralization by pre-existing antibodies [70].
Vaccine-induced HAI antibody titer is currently accepted as the correlate of protection 
against influenza. An HAI titer of ≥1:40 in healthy adults is the titer at which approximately 
50% of individuals are protected from infection. However, some studies have indicated that 
a higher HAI titer may be required in children and that T cells may be a better indicator for 
protection in the elderly [79, 80]. Also, serum HAI antibody titer is not a reliable correlate 
of protection for seasonal and pandemic LAIV vaccines. LAIV has been shown to be effec-
tive in the absence of a robust serum antibody response [77]. The HAI antibody titer also 
fails to take into account other aspects of immune memory against the virus, including the 
contribution of non-neutralizing antibodies and T cell responses to protection. The immune 
response to influenza is complicated, and there could be several correlates of protection 
apart from HAI antibodies. A more comprehensive immunological analysis and an integra-
tive genomic analysis of the human immune response [81] using the different influenza 
vaccines could further define other correlates of protection to better interpret influenza vac-
cine efficacy [82].
Influenza A viruses (IAVs) infects human, swine, and domestic poultry; therefore; interspe-
cies and intercontinental spread make IAV more complicated. Vaccination of domestic poul-
try (including chicken and turkey) is common against the HPAI, H5/H7 LPAI, and H9N2 
LPAI worldwide. In the past, emergency vaccination against HPAI to control epizootics has 
occurred. Areas include Mexico (H5N1, 1995), Pakistan (H7N3, 1995–2004), Asia/Africa/
Europe (H5N1, 1996–continuing), and North Korea (H7N7, 2005) to aid in stamping out pro-
grammes [83]. Poultry vaccines are manufactured inexpensively and are not filtered and puri-
fied like human vaccines and usually contain a whole virus, and not just HA antigen. Mineral 
oil, which induces a strong immune reaction and causes inflammation and abscesses, is added 
as an adjuvant to poultry vaccines.
Usage of vaccine to control swine influenza virus (SIV) varies by countries; some countries use 
vaccination strategies, while others do not. For examples, SIV vaccination is conducted exten-
sively in Europe and North America. In Korea, on the other hand, vaccines for SIV control are 
rarely used despite availability in the market. Because of the genetic diversity of circulating 
SIV strains, most commercial vaccines consist of multiple strains of subtype H1N1, H1N2, 
and H3N2. Nevertheless, the rapid evolution of circulating viruses could surpass the updates 
of commercial vaccines. Combining the herd-specific autogenous vaccine with other commer-
cialized vaccines occurs in some countries; about 20% of pig farms in the United States used 
autogenous vaccines in 2006. However, compared to avian influenza viruses, vaccines against 
SIVs have not been used extensively by swine veterinarians in many countries because other 
major pathogens including the porcine reproductive syndrome virus and porcine circovirus 
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are considered more important [83]. Nevertheless, successful application of influenza vac-
cines in animals may contribute in reducing zoonotic transmission.
6. Antiviral resistance mutants
Antiviral resistance in influenza viruses is a global concern and the number of resistant 
mutants is increasing year after year. The antiviral drugs have been formulated mainly against 
the M2 ion channel (amantadine and rimantadine) and the neuraminidase proteins (oselta-
mivir and zanamivir) of influenza viruses. These FDA approved drugs are currently used 
for prophylaxis and treatment of influenza A infections and are effective against the HPAI 
H5N1 viruses [84]. The effectiveness of these drugs ranges from 80 to 90% if the treatment 
had begun within 48 hours of infection [85]. The antiviral resistance in influenza may develop 
during disease treatment and occasionally spreads widely to replace the susceptible strains in 
the absence of drug pressure. An example of this event is the global spread of adamantane-
resistant H3N2 viruses in the year 2003, oseltamivir-resistant seasonal H1N1 viruses since 
2007 and more recently the adamantane-resistant pandemic A (H1N1) viruses in 2009. Such 
events show the highly unpredictable nature of influenza viruses and increase the challenge 
of its management. Sometimes a single reassortment event or mutations leads to emergence 
of variant influenza viruses such as the pandemic 2009 or seasonal A (H1N1) viruses that 
becomes completely unresponsive to most antiviral drugs. The amantadine resistance was 
soon observed after the discovery of the drug in early 1960s and studies subsequently reported 
that a single point mutation in the M2 protein lead to the emergence of high-level resistant 
mutant viruses showing resistance to both amantadine and rimantadine [86]. Other studies 
also suggested that resistance to M2 blockers (amantadine/rimantadine) can be achieved by 
only a few substitutions in the codon L26, L27, A30, A31 and G34 of the M2 gene [87] and these 
mutants retain the virulence and are transmissible between humans [88]. A study showed that 
adamantane resistance emerged in about 30% of patients post few days of treatment [89]. 
Another study has shown the synergistic antiviral effects of amantadine-oseltamivir combi-
nation chemotherapy [90]. The adamantanes were very effective for almost 4 decades after 
which the frequency of adamantine resistance among influenza A H3N2 viruses started to 
increase. The global resistance among H3N2 virus was as low as 0.8% between the periods 
1991 to 1995. The adamantine resistance has now been reported for human H1N1, H3N2 and 
H5N1 avian influenza viruses. The frequency of resistance further increased to 28% during 
2004–2005 and to 72% in 2005–2006 for H1N1 variant viruses [1]. The US reported around 92% 
resistance among H3N2 viruses by the year 2005. A recent study based on the frequency and 
distribution of M2 gene mutations in influenza virus variants that circulated between 1902 
and 2013 showed that 45.2% of all resistant influenza A viruses (H1-H17) circulating globally 
had S31 N mutations [91].
Similarly the NA mutations causing resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors (NAI) has lots of 
variations. The most common mutation observed is the H275Y that confers high resistance 
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to oseltamivir [92]. A study showed that the amino acid changes at residue 223 (I → R/V) 
conferred reduced inhibition to oseltamivir and zanamivir [93]. The N2 subtype has been 
associated with oseltamivir resistance due to mutation at E119V and R292K. The R292K has 
also been linked to zanamivir resistance [94]. Studies have demonstrated that the most fre-
quent mutation conferring the oseltamivir resistance in NA of the H1N1 and H5N1 subtypes 
was H274Y, while the E119V and R292K mutations were more common among the H3N2 and 
H7N9 subtypes [95]. Another study showed that R292K mutation in NA protein in the H7N9 
virus strains were detected in patients after drug treatment. This substitution promoted resis-
tance against oseltamivir [96]. Similarly oseltamivir resistance was associated with the H274Y 
NA mutation in H5N1 influenza viruses detected in patients during treatment or prophylaxis 
[97]. Few other studies have reported that the Egyptian H5N1avian influenza isolates from 
humans had N294S NA mutation [98]. Boltz et al. reported that H5N1 viruses of clade 2.3.2 
isolated from the Republic of Laos in 2006–2008 had V116A, I222L, and S246 N mutations in 
NA [99]. The ongoing concerns about influenza A viruses and increasing antiviral resistance 
needs immediate attention, better antiviral surveillance for better management and control of 
future influenza pandemics.
7. Infection control, advances in vaccines and therapeutics
Generally, people infected with the flu are advised to stay home and rest, both to recover 
and to avoid infecting others. In severe cases, or for individuals at high risk of complications, 
physicians may prescribe antiviral medication. The antiviral drugs currently available against 
influenza viruses are adamantane derivatives (amantadine and rimantadine) and neuramini-
dase (NA) inhibitors (zanamivir, oseltamivir and peramivir). A viral infection can be inhibited 
at several crucial steps, such as entry, signaling, assembly, and egress [1].
Oseltamivir, works by blocking neuraminidase that enables newly made influenza virus to 
escape from an infected cell. Zanamivir (inhaled), peramivir (intravenous), and inavir (inhaled) 
operate in a similar way. Baloxavir, discovered in Osaka, received preliminary approval in 
Japan in January 2018 and will be filed for regulatory review in the US and Europe thereafter. 
Baloxavir requires a single dose, unlike oseltamivir which is taken twice a day for 5 days [100].
Efforts to improve currently available vaccines have been explored over the last 2 decades 
such as: increasing the antigen dose, intradermal route of administration to activate other 
arms of the immune system, and adding immunostimulating compounds such as adjuvants 
[78]. The main areas of research and development in flu vaccines involve:
1. Creation of vaccines with protective immunity lasting more than one season,
2. Shortening of the production time to allow a virological assessment nearer the upcom-
ing influenza season. Cell-culture-based vaccines (e.g., Optaflu, Flucelvax, Preflucel, and 
Celvapan) are also being used to overcome this issue [101].
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3. Development of a universal vaccine that protects against influenza regardless of what 
influenza viruses are circulating. These includes vaccine targeting the HA stalk domain 
[102, 103], and the use of influenza-virus-like particles as vaccines [104].
In addition to antiviral drugs and vaccines, several novel therapeutic alternatives may 
prove to be beneficial in the near future. The long-acting inhaled neuraminidase inhibitor 
CS-8958 (also known as R-118958) has shown promising results in murine models of influ-
enza treatment while a polymerase inhibitor, T-705 (Toyama Chemical), that inhibits viral 
RNA polymerase has been found to be effective against all three influenza virus types (A, B 
and C) and to some extent against other RNA viruses, including hemorrhagic fever viruses. 
The drug, DAS181, a fusion construct that includes the sialidase from Actinomyces viscosus, 
affects the viral attachment process during the early stages of influenza replication. 
Another study demonstrated the antiviral properties of chlorogenic acid (CHA) and its 
inhibitory effect on A/PuertoRico/8/1934 (H1N1) and oseltamivir-resistant strains in the 
late stage of the infectious cycle. Other novel antiviral drugs under clinical development 
include AVI-7100, a 20-mer phosphorodiamidate morpholino oligomer (PMO) IV formula-
tion that hinders translation and splicing of mRNA from the matrix gene. EV-077, a dual 
thromboxane receptor antagonist and thromboxane synthase inhibitor, prevents virus 
replication by inhibiting prostanoids associated with influenza infections. Aureonitol, a 
compound obtained from fungi, has shown inhibitory effects against both influenza A 
and B virus replication by impairing virus adsorption. Monoclonal antibodies, CR6261 
and CR8020, bind to the conserved stalk region of HA and inhibit the entry and fusion 
stages. A broad spectrum human monoclonal antibody (mAb- MEDI8852), which unlike 
other stem-reactive antibodies, used a rare heavy chain VH (VH6-1) gene, was found to be 
effective in mice and ferrets and better than oseltamivir [1]. These novel approaches will 
potentially become effective tools for managing seasonal, zoonotic and pandemic influenza 
virus infections.
8. Conclusions
Influenza viruses have a silent reservoir in the aquatic avian species and continuously pose 
threat to human population. The avian, swine and other zoonotic influenza infections may 
range from a mild upper respiratory tract infection to a more severe pneumonia, acute respira-
tory distress syndrome and even death. Humans can be infected with a wide range of avian 
[subtypes A(H5N1), A(H7N9), and A(H9N2)] and swine [subtypes A(H1N1), A(H1N2) and 
A(H3N2)] influenza viruses. Although sustained human to human transmission is lacking, these 
viruses can be transmitted when there is a direct contact with infected animals or contaminated 
environments. The virus shows a tremendous potential to mutate, re-assort and give rise novel 
variants to evade host immunity and vaccination strategies. The emergence of antiviral mutants 
has further worsened the worldwide control measures. Although management of influenza has 
been a challenging task owing to its large reservoir and ability to mutate rapidly, the disease can 
be controlled in the animal source to decrease the risk to human population. With advancements 
in modern diagnostic methods, vaccination and antiviral strategies, the annual epidemics and 
occasional pandemics can be managed efficiently.
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9. Future perspectives
The public health threats from influenza viruses have always been a global concern. They are not 
only responsible for annual epidemics throughout the world, but also affect quality of life and 
have negative impacts on the economy due to frequent school and work place absenteeism. The 
frequencies of influenza infections have further increased due to co-mingling in shared human-
animal environment. The virus is known to acquire antigenic shift and drifts and thus pose chal-
lenges in control measures and management. Advancements in vaccination strategies, discovery 
of novel drugs and antiviral therapeutics along with development of a universal influenza vac-
cine are promising approaches toward the management of future epidemics and pandemics.
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